We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.
Introduction
In this paper, we study manipulability of stable matching mechanisms in a general market: there are two sides, such as firms and workers. Each agent can sign a set of contracts with agents on the other side of the market, and each agent has strict preferences over sets of contracts. Each contract specifies a firm, a worker, and the terms of matching between these two agents which can involve many components such as wages, benefits, etc. The prominent solution concept in such matching markets is stability. If a matching is stable, then each agent is willing to keep all of 1 Stable matchings exist for many-to-many matching markets when contracts are substitutes (Roth, 1984; Fleiner, 2003; Klaus and Walzl, 2009; Hatfield and Kominers, 2012; Chambers and Yenmez, 2014; Pycia and Yenmez, 2014) . Contracts are substitutes when a contract that is chosen from a larger set is also chosen from a smaller set including that contract.
2 Since we derive our results in the general model of matching with contracts, our results are applicable both to classical matching problems and auctions.
While we study a manipulability concept that takes into account how much agents can gain from manipulation, our results are most closely related to Pathak and Sönmez's results on a weaker manipulability notion, which does not take the size of gains into account, and which they call as-strong manipulability. For this less demanding manipulability concept, they show in the context of one-to-one matching, that if mechanism is always as good as mechanism for an agent, then mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism by this agent. This corresponds to one of the implications in our Theorem 1.
The manipulability comparisons extend earlier results on strategy-proofness of stable mechanisms. For one-to-one matching markets without contracts, Dubins and Freedman (1981) show that workers cannot gain by misreporting their preferences in the worker-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) . Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) extend this analysis to many-to-one matching markets with contracts in which contracts are substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand for firms. On the other hand, Gale and Sotomayor (1985) point out that even though workers cannot gain by misreporting their preferences, firms may have incentives to misreport their preferences for the same algorithm. Thus, they show that any stable mechanism is as manipulable as the deferred acceptance algorithm for the proposing side. Pathak and Sönmez (2013) strengthen this insight and show that any other stable mechanism is more manipulable (in the sense that it does not take the size of gains into account) than the deferred acceptance algorithm for the proposing side, and that the deferred acceptance is more manipulable for the accepting side. In contrast, we take the size of gains into account, and we compare all stable mechanisms.
Manipulability presupposes that agents' preferences belong to some domain of preference rankings. We assume that the preferences satisfy the standard assumptions of substitutes and the law of aggregate demand but we do not restrict attention to the domain of all such preferences.
3 We allow any domain of preferences satisfying these two conditions that is closed in the following sense: When we restrict the set of acceptable contracts for an agent to a stable matching outcome, we remain in the domain. We think that the concept of a closed domain is well suited to the study of incentive properties of matching mechanisms and that it might find applications beyond the analysis of our note. Most of the preference domains used in the literature-e.g., the domain of responsive preferences, the domain of substitutable preferences, and the domain of preferences that satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand-are closed. Our manipulability notions are applied in Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2014) . They show the existence of quantile stable mechanisms and compare them in terms of manipulability.
Model
There are two sets of agents: the set of firms F , and the set of workers W . The set of all agents is denoted by A ⌘ F [ W . Each contract x is bilateral and specifies the relationship between a firm-worker pair. The firm and worker associated with contract x are represented by x F 2 F and x W 2 W , respectively. The set of all contracts is finite and denoted by X. For a set of contracts
, a 2 {x F , x W }} denotes the set of contracts that agent a is associated with. A set of contracts X 0 ✓ X is feasible if for every firm-worker pair (f, w), |X 0 f \ X 0 w |  1, i.e., each firm-worker pair can sign at most one joint contract. A matching is a feasible set of contracts.
Each agent a is endowed with a strict preference relation a over sets of contracts that involve agent a, i.e., over 2
To ease notation, we suppress the dependence on a throughout the paper when this does not lead to any ambiguity and denote the set of chosen contracts from subset X 0 ✓ X by C a (X 0 ). Similarly, for any set of contracts
be the sets of chosen contracts for the set of workers and firms, respectively. We say that a contract x is acceptable to agent a if there exists a set of contracts X a containing
x such that X a a ;; otherwise, we say that contract x is unacceptable to agent a. Given agents and their preferences, we would like to find a matching that no set of agents would like to deviate from. This is formalized in the following definition of stability.
Definition 1. Given a preference profile , a matching Y is stable if 1. for all a, C a (Y ) = Y a (individual rationality) and 2. there does not exist a nonempty set of contracts Z 6 6 ✓ Y such that for all a,
Stability for a matching entails two things: Individual rationality requires that each agent is better o↵ by holding all of the contracts assigned rather than rejecting some of them. On the other hand, no blocking states that there is no subset of contracts Z such that every agent a would prefer Z a if Z were available to them. This is the standard definition of stability for many-to-many matching with contracts: see Hatfield and Kominers (2012) .
We make the following assumptions on agents' preferences in our analysis:
Definition 2. Contracts are substitutes in the preferences of agent a if for any sets of contracts
Contracts are substitutes if a contract that is chosen from a larger set is still chosen from a smaller set including that contract. Substitutability is standard in matching: see Kelso and Crawford (1982) ; Roth (1984) . It guarantees the existence of a stable matching in our setup (Fleiner, 2003) . 
The law of aggregate demand requires that the number of contracts chosen from a set is bigger than the number of contracts chosen from a subset of that set. The law of aggregate demand was introduced in Alkan (2002), Alkan and Gale (2003) , and Fleiner (2003) and its implications were thoroughly analyzed by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) (see also Kojima (2007) ).
An important class of preferences that satisfies both substitutability and the law of aggregate demand is the class of responsive preferences. Contracts are responsive in the preferences of agent a, if this agent has a ranking of all contracts and some capacity, and if his choice function selects the most preferred contracts in the set without going over the capacity. Responsive preferences are routinely used in matching, including the seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1962) .
To study matching mechanisms, we need to specify the preference domains of all agents. For each agent, let us fix a subset P a of the set of all preference relations over sets of contracts that include agent a. We refer to P a as the preference domain of agent a. We refer to P ⌘ ⇥ a2A P a simply as the preference profile domain.
We need the following definition of closedness for preference profile domains:
Definition 4. Preference profile domain P is closed if for all 2 P and for all matchings Y that are stable with respect to , if the preference relation 0 a ranks sets of contracts in the same way as a except that only contracts in Y a are acceptable to agent a, then 0 a 2 P a .
Closedness for a preference profile domain means that when we restrict the set of acceptable contracts for an agent to a stable matching outcome, we remain in the domain. There are many such domains:
• the domain of all preferences in which contracts are substitutes,
• the domain of all preferences in which contracts are substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand, and
• the domain of all preferences in which contracts are responsive.
For what follows, we fix a preference profile domain P that is closed and contracts are substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand in the preferences of agents. This allows us to use the rural hospitals theorem, which states that any agent signs the same number of contracts in any stable matching when contracts are substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand in the preferences of agents (see Roth (1986) , Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) , and Hatfield and Kominers (2012)).
5
A mechanism maps preference profiles from P to matchings. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote by ( )(a) the set of contracts that allocates to agent a under preference profile . Mechanism is stable if for all preference profiles 2 P the matching ( ) is stable with respect to .
The following property of closed domains of substitutable preferences satisfying law of aggregate demand will be useful: Lemma 1. If mechanisms and are stable, then for every agent a and every preference profile 2 P , we have
Proof. Consider any 0 a 2 P a . By the symmetry of the lemma, it is enough to construct 00 a 2 P a such that ( This lemma shows that the set of outcomes that is achievable for an agent in two stable matchings is the same. This lemma is useful in establishing our results below.
A mechanism is strategy-proof for agent a if for every 2 P and 0 a 2 P a , ( )(a) ⌫ a ( 0 a , a )(a). In words, when a mechanism is strategy-proof for an agent, the agent cannot gain from misreporting her preferences.
Main Results: Manipulability of Matching Mechanisms
In this section, we study stable matching mechanisms and compare them in terms of their manipulability. Fix a mechanism . The key auxiliary concept in defining manipulability notions is the set of improvements,
which is comprised of improvements that agent a can obtain by misreporting to mechanism when the preference profile is . When mechanism is strategy-proof, then M (a, , ) = ; for every a 2 A and 2 P .
Definition 5. Mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism for agent a if
for every preference profile 2 P . Mechanism is more manipulable than mechanism for agent a if is as manipulable as for agent a and there exists a preference profile 2 P such that
In words, mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism for agent a whenever any gain from misreporting her preferences at mechanism is also a possible gain un-der .
6 More manipulability is the strict ordering counterpart of as-manipulability.
These manipulability concepts are natural ordinal counterparts of the cardinal notions of "incentives to misreport" of Day and Milgrom (2008) and of the "intense and strong manipulability" of Pathak and Sönmez (2013) . We provide a detailed discussion in the next section. Our results establish a tight relationship between manipulability and consistent preference for a mechanism: the better the mechanism is for an agent, the less manipulable it becomes. Theorem 1. Let a be an agent. Suppose that and are two stable mechanisms. Then ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a) for every 2 P if and only if mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism for agent a.
A weaker version of the first implication of this theorem was proven by Pathak and Sönmez (2013) under the assumptions that each worker has unit demand (i.e., for all w 2 W and Y ✓ X, |C w (Y )|  1), each firm-worker pair uniquely defines a contract, and contracts are responsive. The converse implication is new (as is Theorem 2, which we state and prove next).
Proof. () direction) Assume that ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a) for every 2 P . Let preference profile 2 P and preference relation 0 a 2 P a be such that
Since and are stable mechanisms, Lemma 1 implies that there exists a preference relation 00 a 2 P a such that ( 00 a , a )(a) = ( 0 a , a )(a). This equation, the abovedisplayed strict preference comparison, and the hypothesis that ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a), imply that (
6 Equivalently, mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism for agent a if for any preference profile 2 P , the following holds: if there exist agent a and preference relation 0 a 2 P a such that ( Therefore, mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism for agent a.
(( direction) Now assume that mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism for agent a. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a preference profile 2 P such that ( )(a) a ( )(a). Let 0 a be the preference ranking identical to a except that only contracts in ( )(a) are acceptable; since P is closed, 0 a 2 P a . As in the proof of Lemma 1, the stability of and , and the rural hospitals theorem imply that (
Consequently, ( 0 a , a )(a) a ( )(a). This, together with the assumption that is as manipulable as mechanism for agent a, implies the existence of But the above equality implies ( 00 a , a )(a) = ( )(a), contradicting the inequality.
Theorem 1 provides a complete characterization of as-manipulability. Next, we consider the notion of more-manipulability.
Theorem 2. Let a be an agent. Suppose that and are two stable mechanisms. Then (i) ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a) for every 2 P , and (ii) ( )(a) a ( )(a) for some preference profile 2 P are satisfied if and only if mechanism is more manipulable than for agent a.
Proof. (( direction) Let us first assume that is more manipulable than for agent a. Then, Theorem 1 implies condition (i). Furthermore, if condition (ii) fails for all preference profiles, then for every 2 P , ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a). This inequality and condition (i) imply ( )(a) = ( )(a). This contradicts the assumption that is more manipulable than for agent a.
() direction) For the remainder of the proof, assume conditions (i) and (ii). Theorem 1 implies that M (a, , ) ◆ M (a, , ), and it remains to show that M (a, , ) 6 = M (a, , ) for some 2 P . To prove this last statement, take 2 P to be a preference profile satisfying (ii). Since and are stable mechanisms, Lemma 1 implies that there exists a preference relation 0 a 2 P a such that ( 0 a , a )(a) = ( )(a). Thus, ( ) 2 M (a, , ) . Since ( ) / 2 M (a, , ), we infer that M (a, , ) 6 = M (a, , ) and conclude the proof.
For the special case of workers with unit demand, that is, when for all w 2 W and Y ✓ X we have |C w (Y )|  1, one corollary of our results is that no two distinct stable mechanisms can be compared in terms of manipulability for all agents in the market.
Corollary 1. If workers have unit demand, then no stable mechanism is as manipulable as another stable mechanism for all agents in the market.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that stable mechanism is as manipulable as another stable mechanism for all agents in the market. Since and are di↵erent, there exists 0 2 P such that ( 0 ) 6 = ( 0 ). In particular, there exists a firmf such
By Theorem 1, for every 2 P , ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a) for every agent a. In particular, for every worker w, C w ( (
) by substitutability. But this means that {x} is a blocking set for ( 0 ), which cannot hold since is a stable mechanism. As a result, for every
Since choice functions are constructed from preferences, we get (
This result suggests that manipulability cannot be used as a criterion to choose from stable matchings when both sides of the market are strategic agents as in the medical match. However, when only one side of the market is strategic then we can use the deferred acceptance algorithm as in school choice since it is strategy-proof for students (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) .
Discussion
Our definitions of as manipulability and more manipulability take the size of potential gains into account. In particular, our as-manipulability notion is the ordinal counterpart of Day and Milgrom (2008) concept of "incentives to misreport" and Pathak and Sönmez (2013) concept of "intense and strong manipulability," both defined in the setting with cardinal values.
To see the relationship between our ordinal concept and their cardinal ones, we introduce cardinal utilities. For the sake of this characterization, we say that a profile of cardinal utilities {u a } a2A that maps the sets of contracts X a to utility values u a (X a ) 2 R for each agent a is consistent with the preference profile if we have
We have the following equivalence result:
Theorem 3. Mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism for agent a if and only if for each 2 P , there is a profile u of cardinal utilities consistent with and such that
The cardinal manipulability comparison captured in the displayed inequality (1) is what Pathak and Sönmez (2013) call being as intensely and strongly manipulable as . 7 Furthermore, each side of the above inequality is what Day and Milgrom (2008) call "incentive profile" of the core-selecting auctions they study; the core-selecting auctions are a special case of the stable mechanisms we study in the general matching with contracts framework.
Before proving Theorem 3, let us consider any 2 P and notice that the existence of a utility profile consistent with and satisfying (1) is equivalent to (1) being satisfied for all utility profiles consistent with . Indeed, the equivalence follows easily from the definition of consistency.
Proof. Let us fix and any utility profile u consistent with . Since and are stable, Lemma 1 implies that the maximum utility achievable by an agent under and is the same:
This equality yields the theorem as follows: () direction) Suppose that mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism for agent a, and fix and any utility profile u consistent with . By Theorem 1, ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a), and consistency implies u a ( ( )(a)) u a ( ( )(a)). This inequality and equation (2) imply (1).
(( direction) The hypothesis (1) and equation (2) imply u a ( ( )(a)) u a ( ( )(a)). Therefore, ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a), and Theorem 1 implies that mechanism is as manipulable as mechanism .
Conclusion
Studying natural intensity-based manipulability notions for stable matching mechanisms, we have shown that manipulability comparison for an agent is equivalent to preference comparison. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, then no two stable mechanisms are comparable in terms of manipulability when agents on both sides of the market are strategic as in the medical match.
A Analogues of Our Results for Manipulability without Comparability of Gains
While we focus on manipulability concepts that take into account the size of gains (as in Day and Milgrom (2008) and Pathak and Sönmez (2013) ), there are also natural manipulability concepts that do not require comparability of gains, but only that manipulations are possible, irrespective of achieved gains. Pathak and Sönmez (2013) studied such a weaker concept of manipulability comparison and call it strong manipulability. Since their as strong manipulability concept is more permissive than the concept we call simply "manipulability," and which corresponds to Pathak and Sönmez' "intense and strong manipulability), we refer to the weaker concept as "nonintense manipulability."
Definition 6. Mechanism is as non-intensely manipulable as mechanism for agent a if for any preference profile 2 P , the following holds: if there exist agent a and preference relation 0 a 2 P a such that ( 0 a , a )(a) a ( )(a), then there exists a preference relation 00 a 2 P a such that ( 00 a , a )(a) a ( )(a).
For this weaker manipulability concept, the analogue of one of the implications of Theorem 1 is immediately implied by our theorem. However, only a weak form of the reverse direction continues to hold. Let us first show in an example that the full analogue of the reverse direction does not have to hold, and then establish the weak form of the reverse direction that holds. Example 1. Suppose there are three or more agents on each side of the market and fix an agent a. Consider any two stable mechanisms and that always choose one of agent a's most preferred stable matchings except if there are exactly three distinct stable outcomes for agent a. In the latter case, mechanism chooses one of the worst stable matchings for agent a while mechanism chooses one of the stable matchings that match agent a with his median stable outcome.
With three or more agents on each side of the market, there is a preference profile with exactly three distinct stable outcomes for agent a. Thus, the two mechanisms are di↵erent and mechanism does not preference-dominate mechanism for agent a. At the same time, mechanism is as non-intensely manipulable as mechanism . The analogue of Theorem 1 then takes the following form.
Theorem 4. Let a be an agent. Suppose that and are two stable mechanisms. If ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a) for every 2 P , then is as non-intensely manipulable as for agent a. Conversely, suppose that is as non-intensely manipulable as for agent a and one of these two mechanisms is strategy-proof for agent a, then ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a) for every 2 P .
Proof. If ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a) for every 2 P , then is as manipulable as for agent a by Theorem 1. Thus, is as non-intensely manipulable as for agent a.
To prove the second statement, we need the following: Claim. Let ' be a stable mechanism, which is strategy-proof for agent a. Then '( )(a) is the best outcome among all stable matchings with respect to for a. Suppose not. Let X 0 ✓ X a be the best outcome for agent a among stable matchings with respect to . Let 0 a be the preference ranking identical to except that only contracts in X 0 are acceptable. Since P is a closed domain, 0 a 2 P a . As we have shown in the proof of Theorem 1, the rural hospitals theorem and stability of ' imply '( 0 a , a )(a) = X 0 . Therefore, '( 0 a , a )(a) a '( )(a), a contradiction, since ' is strategy-proof for agent a. This completes the proof of the claim. Now, there are two cases to consider. First, suppose that is strategy-proof for agent a. Since is as non-intensely manipulable as for agent a, mechanism is strategy-proof for agent a. Thus, the claim above implies ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a) since is a stable mechanism. Second, suppose that is strategy-proof for agent a. Then the claim above implies ( )(a) ⌫ a ( )(a) since is a stable mechanism. Thus, in both cases the second statement of Theorem 3 holds true.
A similar analogue of Theorem 2 also holds true.
